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DEREGULATING ARBITRATION
David L. Noll*
In the aftermath of the November 2016 election,
commentators predicted that regulation of arbitration by
federal administrative agencies would halt in its tracks.
But something more interesting happened. Instead of
stopping agency arbitration regulation, Trump’s election
and Republicans’ defense of their House and Senate majorities balkanized it. The new administration has rolled
back some Obama-era rules, but other efforts to undo
agency arbitration regulations have faltered at the administrative level or in the courts. This Article—based
on remarks delivered at the Loyola Consumer Law Review 2017 symposium—maps the terrain of agency arbitration regulation under Trump and discusses why some
efforts to roll back Obama-era regulations have succeeded while others have failed.

*

Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; david.noll@rutgers.edu. This
Article is based on remarks delivered at Loyola Consumer Law Review’s 2017
Symposium, Forcing the Issue: Mandatory Arbitration. Thanks to Christine
Chabot, Deepak Gupta, Margaret Moses, Kelvin Chen, Matthew Sag, David
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INTRODUCTION

I

n the final years of the Obama administration, a flurry of federal
administrative agencies undertook the task of regulating mandatory arbitration in areas that they regulate.1 The agency interventions took the form of rules issued under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 principles announced in agency
adjudications,3 and litigating positions.4 They responded to an increase in the use of arbitration—particularly in consumer and employment contracts5—following a string of Supreme Court decisions that required arbitration agreements to be enforced
according to their terms.6 In an effort to limit arbitration’s effects
1

See David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985,
988-89 (2017) (cataloging agency actions). By “mandatory” arbitration, this
Article refers to arbitration that is ordered pursuant to an agreement to
arbitrate that the parties entered into in advance of a dispute.
2
5 U.S.C. § 553.
3
See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014); D.R. Horton,
Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, (2012).
4
See EEOC's Response in Opposition to Doherty Enterprises, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss, EEOC v. Doherty Ents., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (S.D.
Fla. 2015), No. 9:14-cv-81184-KAM (Jan. 6, 2015).
5
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 201503, ARBITRATION STUDY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (2015); Alexander
J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Access to Justice in Employment Arbitration: A
Critical Look, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016).
6
See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(holding that a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the FAA
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures); StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (holding that
imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are “silent”
on that issue violates the Federal Arbitration Act); Green Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (considering but not resolving whether a
contract that did not expressly provide for class arbitration allowed class
arbitration). For analysis of the rationale for the arbitration revolution, see
Noll, supra note 1, at 993-99. See also David L. Noll, The New Conflicts
Law, 41 STAN. J. COMPLEX LIT. 41, 69-72 (2014) (analyzing the Court’s
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on rights they enforced and programs they administered, agencies
imposed conditions on the use of arbitration—for example, requiring that arbitration clauses not be used to block class actions—or
completely barred the use of arbitration in specific domains. Commenters described the flurry of agency arbitration regulation as the
next battle in the United States’ “arbitration wars.”7
The November 2016 election presented a serious threat to
agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration. The Supreme Court’s
preference for mandatory arbitration and distaste for litigation is
shared by many congressional Republicans, who successfully defended their majorities in the House and Senate. The incoming
President ran on a platform of deregulating business. One of his
top advisors spoke of “deconstruct[ing]” the “administrative state”
(i.e., the federal bureaucracy).8 With opponents of federal regulation controlling both Congress and the Presidency, it was reasonable to expect that regulation of arbitration by federal administrative agencies would stop in its tracks.9 This Article refers to this
prediction as the “U-Turn hypothesis.” According to that hypothesis, Trump’s election meant the end of federal administrative agencies regulating arbitration.

arbitration cases as a response to the problem of inter-jurisdictional regulatory conflict).
7
See David O. Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6).
8
Jeremy W. Peters, All Is on Track, Bannon Tells Conservatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2017, at A1.
9
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Business Lobby Hopes Trump Undoes
Regulation, Limits Litigation, (Nov. 9, 2016) (quoting a conservative lawyer to the effect that “President Trump and a Republican Congress have a
chance to roll back federal agency prohibitions on mandatory arbitration
clauses, enact legislation to restrict private lawsuits and undo laws already
on the books”), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-frankel-otc/businesslobby-hopes-trump-undoes-regulation-limits-litigationidUSKBN1343MY; David L. Noll, The CFPB’s Arbitration Rule: The
Road Ahead, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NYU 69TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT AND CONSUMER DISPUTES (forthcoming 2017) (examining
the prospects for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s arbitration
rule under Trump and concluding that they were poor),
https://ssrn.com/abstra ct=2873866.
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In fact, something more interesting happened. Instead of
halting agency arbitration regulation, the 2016 election balkanized
it. Ten months into the new administration, the Trump administration has successfully rolled back some Obama-era arbitration
regulations. But the administration’s efforts to roll back other regulations have faltered at the administrative level, or are at risk of
being reversed by the courts. Meanwhile, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) continued its longstanding effort to regulate
the use of arbitration clauses to block employees from joining together to assert workplace grievances—a position that setup an extraordinary conflict within the executive branch over the agency’s
regulatory authority. Thus, under Trump, agency arbitration regulation has not stopped but fragmented, with different agencies
taking different tracks, and their efforts provoking legal challenges
from both supporters and critics of their work.
This Article, based on remarks delivered at the Loyola Consumer Law Review’s 2017 symposium, maps the terrain of agency
arbitration regulation under Trump and discusses why some efforts to roll back Obama-era regulations have succeeded and others have failed. A central theme, as expressed by Terry Moe, is that
“[w]hatever is formalized will tend to endure.”10 Regulations issued
via relatively formal forms of administrative policymaking, which
have been in place long enough to anchor reliance interests and
avoid congressional review under the Congressional Review Act
(CRA), have proved relatively more difficult to roll back. Conversely, less formal regulations and those promulgated within the
window for congressional review have proved less durable. The
Article also shows how legal uncertainty over agencies’ power to
regulate arbitration has provided the White House and Justice Department appointees with a second opportunity to influence
agency policy by attacking agencies’ authority to regulate arbitration.
Part I describes the two areas where the Trump administration’s effort to deregulate arbitration has unequivocally succeeded:
the repeal of arbitration provisions in federal procurement regulations issued under the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive
10

Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the
Story, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 240 (1990).
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Order, and the repeal of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Arbitration Rule. Part II describes efforts by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Education, and Department of Labor to roll back Obama-era arbitration
rules, and the difficulties those agencies encountered doing so. Part
III describes the NLRB’s continued regulation of arbitration notwithstanding the change in administrations, and the Justice Department’s attacks on the agency in the U.S. Supreme Court.
I. SUCCESSFUL DEREGULATION: THE FAIR PAY AND SAFE
WORKPLACES EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CFPB ARBITRATION
RULE
The agency regulations that most closely follow the U-Turn
hypothesis are the ones that have been repealed via the CRA: the
Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order and its implementing regulations, and the CFPB Arbitration Rule.

A. The Fair Pay Order
The Fair Pay order grew out of concerns that federal contractors were using arbitration to avoid accountability for sexual
violence in the workplace.11 In response to the alleged assault of
Haliburton contractor Jamie Leigh Jones and the company’s attempt to force her to arbitrate her legal claims, Congress began in
2010 to bar defense contractors from requiring arbitration of certain employment-related claims.12 The prohibition took the form of
riders to defense appropriations bills that prevented federal money
from being awarded to contractors who mandated arbitration.13
11

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 150 (July 31, 2014), amended
in Executive Order 13683, 79 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 11, 2014).
12
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114113, § 8097, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015) (barring defense contractors from mandating arbitration of claims for sexual assault, sexual harassment, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Pub. L. No. 111-118,
§ 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-3455 (2010). See also Jeﬀrey Adams, The Assault of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman's Horror Story is Changing
Arbitration in America, 11 PEPPERDINE D.R J. 253 (2011) (describing the
provisions’ history).
13
See id.
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The Fair Pay order, issued in July 2014, extended the arbitration
bar to all federal contractors.14 It directed federal procurement officers to ensure that contractors selected for jobs worth more than
$500,000 did not require employees to arbitrate claims for sexual
abuse or violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Department of Defense, General Services Administration, and
NASA issued implementing regulations and guidance in August
2016, which gave effect to the Fair Pay order by setting out new
language for procurement officers to include in bid solicitations.15
Together, the order and its implementing regulations leveraged the
federal government’s position as a market participant to prevent
uses of arbitration that, the White House judged, frustrated the enforcement of job discrimination law.
On March 27, 2017, Trump signed an executive order that
rescinded the Fair Pay order.16 The same day, he signed a congressional resolution of disapproval that repealed the order’s implementing regulations via the CRA.17 The effect of these actions was
to erase the Fair Pay order’s restrictions on federal contractors’
ability to mandate arbitration of employment-related claims.18 Going forward, federal contractors who did not do business with the
Defense Department would be free to require employees to arbitrate workplace claims on the same terms as private-sector employers.
The successful repeal of the regulations implementing the
Fair Pay order reflects the confluence of three factors. First, the
repeal of the order did not disrupt serious reliance interests. Before
the implementing regulations effect, a district judge preliminarily
14

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 150 (July 31, 2014).
Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,562 (Aug.
25, 2016) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 1, 4, 9, 17, 22, 42 and 52); Fair Pay
and Safe Workplaces Final Guidance, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,654 (Aug. 25, 2016)
(to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 22 and 52).
16
Exec. Order No.13782, 82 FR 15,607 (Mar. 27, 2017).
17
H.R.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808.
18
See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1). Under the CRA, the repeal of the Fair Pay
order’s implementing regulations also bars the General Services Administration, Department of Defense, and NASA from issuing new regulations
that are “substantially similar” to the repealed regulations. Id. § 801(b)(2).
See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL, LEGISLATION AND
THE REGULATORY STATE 330-31 (2d ed. 2017).
15
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enjoined the order on the ground that it conflicted with the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).19 As a result of the preliminary injunction,
the main effect of rescinding the order was to remove the uncertainty about non-defense contractors’ ability to mandate arbitration of workplace claims.
Second, the implementing regulations were promulgated
within the window for Congress to act under the CRA. The CRA
provides expedited procedures through which Congress may repeal an agency regulation through majority votes in the House and
Senate.20 But it requires that Congress act within 60 legislative
days of a regulation being transmitted to Congress and published
in the Federal Register.21 Because the regulations implementing
the Fair Pay order were published within the 60-day window, congressional leaders were able to take advantage of the act’s expedited repeal procedures.
Third, the procedures that the administration used to repeal
the Fair Pay order’s arbitration restrictions insulated the repeal
from judicial review. Executive orders generally are exempt from
judicial review under the APA,22 and the CRA provides that “No
determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall
be subject to judicial review.”23 As such, there was no obvious avenue through which the Fair Pay order’s defenders could challenge
the repeal of its implementing regulations.

B. The CFPB Arbitration Rule
The same mix of factors facilitated the administration’s roll
back of the CFPB Arbitration Rule, although the rule nearly escaped repeal. Published in July 2017, the Arbitration Rule would
have barred consumer financial companies from invoking arbitral
class action waivers to block class actions filed in public court.24 It

19

Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (N.D.
Miss. 2016).
20
See 5 U.S.C. § 802.
21
Id.
22
5 U.S.C. § 551 (defining “agencies” whose actions are subject to judicial review in a manner that excludes the President).
23
5 U.S.C. § 805.
24
12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017).
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also required firms to submit data about arbitral filings and case
outcomes to the CFPB to be included in a database.25
The rule built on a large empirical study of consumer arbitration that the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act directed the Bureau to perform.26 It reflected the Bureau’s findings that class action litigation
is an important mechanism for enforcing consumer financial protection laws, that arbitration clauses effectively block access to
class litigation, and that individual claiming and public enforcement by regulatory agencies and criminal prosecutors does not
make up for the enforcement drop-off caused by the widespread
use of arbitral class action waivers.27 To correct arbitration’s effects on enforcement of consumer financial protection laws, the
rule barred firms from using arbitration clauses to block class litigation.
Although the Trump administration fumbled in its early efforts to kill the rule, the administration snatched victory from the
jaws of defeat months before the rule would have taken effect.
Shortly after Trump was sworn in, he reportedly considered firing
CFPB Director Richard Cordray for a grab-bag of alleged misdeeds.28 Dismissing Cordray would have allowed Trump to appoint a Director who shared his regulatory philosophy before
Cordray’s term expired in 2018. But the White House’s threats

25

See id.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (Mar. 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf;
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A) STUDY
RESULTS
TO
DATE
(2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
See also 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2015) (directing the CFPB to “conduct a study
of, and . . . provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements
providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons
and consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer
financial products or services.”).
27
Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,855 (proposed May
24, 2016).
28
Steve Eder, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, Watchdog
Targeted as an Obama-Era Holdover, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2017, at A1.
26
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came to nothing, apparently because it was unwilling to risk a constitutional showdown over the President’s removal authority.
After the CFPB released the final Arbitration Rule in July
2017, Trump’s Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Keith A.
Noreika, threatened to petition the Financial Services Oversight
Council to block the rule on the ground that it posed a threat to the
financial system’s stability.29 That challenge also went nowhere. In
late July, the deadline for FSOC review passed with no action from
Noreika.
The CRA, however, provided a viable procedural pathway
for deregulation. On July 25, 2017, the House passed a CRA resolution disapproving the Arbitration Rule.30 The repeal effort
“stalled” in the Senate after Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) announced he would oppose it because of its effect on members of the
military.31 The Wells Faro and Equifax scandals—both of which
highlighted problematic uses of arbitration—presented another
obstacle to the repeal.32 But on October 24, 2017, Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell called a vote on the repeal resolution after the
Republican Senate leadership succeeded in whipping 50 votes for
it. Late that evening, the Senate passed the resolution by a 51-50
vote, with Vice President Pence casting the tie-breaking vote.33

29

See Letter from Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July 17, 2017), available at https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/07/Noreika-letter-July-17.pdf.
Noreika, a former senior attorney for Wells Fargo, was temporarily appointed as a “special government employee” in an apparent effort to avoid
Senate confirmation and ethics restrictions on government service by employees of regulated parties. See David Dayen, More Trump Populism:
Hiring a Bank Lawyer to Attack CFPB Bank Rules, THE INTERCEPT,
July 20, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/07/20/more-trump-populismhiring-a-bank-lawyer-to-attack-cfpb-bank-rules/.
30
H. J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017).
31
Eder, Silver-Greenberg, & Cowley, supra note 28.
32
See Elizabeth Dexheimer, Democrats Use Equifax, Wells Fargo to
Defend Rule on Bank Suits, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 27, 2017,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/democrats-useequifax-wells-fargo-to-defend-rule-on-bank-suits.
33
See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2017, at A1.
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President Trump is expected to sign the resolution in November
2017.
Like the regulations issued under the Fair Pay order, the
arbitration rule did not engender serious reliance interests, because
it had not taken effect when Congress repealed it via the CRA. The
CRA again provided a streamlined pathway for rolling back the
rule. And repealing the rule via the CRA prevented the rule’s supporters from challenging the lawfulness of the repeal. Indeed, because Congress acted through the CRA, the CFPB is now barred
from issuing “a new rule that is substantially the same” as the original arbitration rule “unless the reissued or new rule is specifically
authorized by a [later] law.”34
II. STUMBLING DEREGULATION
The combination of the lack of serious reliance interests, an
easy pathway for repeal, and insulation from judicial review
proved fatal to the regulations implementing the Fair Pay order
and the CFPB Arbitration Rule. But those same factors have complicated the Trump administration’s efforts to rollback other
Obama-era arbitration regulations.

A. The Fiduciary Rule
One example is provided by the Fiduciary Rule, issued by
the Department of Labor (DOL) in April 2016.35 The product of a
six-year rule making process, the rule expands the definition of a
“fiduciary” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) to cover most firms that give advice to employees
who invest in retirement savings plans. The new definition requires plan advisors to act in employees’ best interests—for example, by recommending investments that will maximize an employee’s investment returns after accounting for her risk
tolerance—and to avoid conflicts of interest that compromise the
advisor’s ability to act in employees’ best interests.

34

5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8,
2016), amended by 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Fiduciary Rule].
35
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ERISA fiduciaries ordinarily cannot be compensated
through commissions, which create an incentive to recommend investments that are not in the investor’s best interests. But the
DOL, acting under a statutory provision that authorizes it to grant
class-wide exemptions from fiduciary status, issued an exemption
allowing advisors to use commission-based compensation if an advisor satisfies a number of conditions.36 Among those conditions is
that the advisor forego the use of arbitral class action waivers to
block class actions filed in public court. DOL reasoned that the
“option to pursue class actions in court is an important enforcement mechanism for Retirement Investors,” because class litigation
addresses “systemic violations affecting many different investors”
and “creates a powerful incentive for Financial Institutions to carefully supervise individual Advisers, and ensure adherence to the
Impartial Conduct Standards.”37 Another exemption that allows
investment advisors to sell their own securities to retirement plan
participants contains a similar condition limiting advisors’ use of
arbitration.38
The Fiduciary Rule originally was scheduled to take effect
on April 16, 2017. On February 3, 2017, Trump issued a “Presidential Memorandum” directing DOL to re-examine the Fiduciary
Rule to ensure that it was “consistent with the policies of my Administration.”39 Although Trump’s appointee to head the DOL, Alexander Acosta, is an accomplished administrative lawyer, the Department’s effort to roll back the rule has faltered. Nine days
before the rule’s effective date, the DOL issued a regulation suspending it for 60 days.40 Observers expected the DOL to delay the
rule indefinitely. But the next month, Secretary Acosta announced

36

See also Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002
(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
37
Id. On the tension between class action waivers and the cost-spreading rationale for class litigation, see generally David L. Noll, Rethinking
Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2012).
38
81 Fed. Reg. 21,002.
39
Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidentialmemorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule.
40
Definition of the Term Fiduciary, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902 (Apr. 7, 2017)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
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that the DOL could not lawfully do so.41 Instead, Acosta said, the
DOL would open a new rulemaking to develop changes to the rule.
The formal rulemaking has not yet begun. But on August
31, 2017, the DOL published a notice of proposed rulemaking that
proposed to put off the arbitration provision’s effective date for
another year and a half, until July 2019, when the Department predicted its new rule would be complete.42 In the meantime, courts
upheld the original Fiduciary Rule’s arbitration provisions as a
valid exercise of the DOL’s delegated authority in high-profile
challenges to the rule.43
The same factors that allowed the Trump administration to
roll back the Fair Pay order and CFPB Arbitration Rule complicated its efforts to roll back the Fiduciary Rule. Because the Fiduciary Rule was finalized outside the window for congressional review under the CRA, it could only be modified through legislation
(a near-impossibility given the complexity of the subject matter) or
a fresh round of notice-and-comment rulemaking. A new rulemaking, however, requires the Department to compile an administrative record that provides a reasoned explanation for any changes
to the rule.44 It also ensures that the Department’s actions will be

41

Alexander Acosta, Deregulators Must Follow the Law, So Regulators Will Too, WALL. ST. J., (May 22, 2017, 7:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/deregulators-must-follow-the-law-so-regulators-will-too-1495494029.
42
Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability Dates, 82
Fed. Reg. 41,365 (Aug. 31, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
43
See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Am. v. Hugler,
No. 3:16-CV-1476-M, 2017 WL 514424 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017) (upholding the rule on cross motions for summary judgment); Nat’l Ass’n for
Fixed Annuities v. Perez, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016) (upholding rule
on cross motions for preliminary injunction and summary judgment); Mkt.
Synergy Grp., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-CV-4083DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 661592 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2017) (upholding rule on
cross-motions for summary judgment).
44
See FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (agency changing its
prior position must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
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subject to review under FCC v. Fox and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm, which instruct courts to scrutinize the adequacy of an agency’s reasons for changing administrative policy.45
Withstanding such a challenge will be difficult because the
Department compiled a massive record to support the original Fiduciary Rule, which showed among other things that investment
advisors’ conflicted advice cost retirement plan participants billions of dollars in lost savings.46 The original rule also gave rise to
significant reliance interests as firms such as Vanguard, TIAA, and
Transamerica adapted their systems to comply with the rule.47 Under Fox, such interests increase the burden an administrative
agency must carry to justify changing a regulation.48

B. The Borrower Defense Rule
The same mix of factors has frustrated efforts of the Trump
Department of Education (DOE) to roll back the Borrower Defense rule. Prompted by the collapse of the for-profit Corinthian
Colleges, the rule establishes uniform federal standards for the circumstances in which a student can discharge federal student loans
because of fraud or misrepresentations about a school’s educational program. The rule also establishes new internal agency procedures for resolving discharge claims that arise from a common
course of conduct. Finally, in an effort to prevent future Corinthian-style collapses, the rule bars schools from using a number of
contract provisions that diminish the effectiveness of private civil

45

See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (authorizing judicial review “[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court”).
46
See Definition of the Term Fiduciary; Conflict of Interest Rule—
Retirement Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21928, 21930 (Apr. 20, 2015)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509 and 2510). (proposed rule) (“The underperformance associated with conflicts of interest—in the mutual funds
segment alone—could cost IRA investors more than $210 billion over the
next 10 years and nearly $500 billion over the next 20 years.”).
47
See Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to Edward Hugler, Acting
Secretary of Labor (Feb. 7, 2017) (highlighting financial institutions’ expressions of support for the fiduciary rule), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017-2-7_Warren_Ltr_to_DOL.pdf.
48
129 S. Ct. at 1811.
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litigation to enforce students’ rights. They include arbitration
clauses, class-action waivers, and “gag clauses” that require students to make use of a school’s internal dispute resolution facilities
before seeking assistance from the courts and government officials.
After the change in administrations, the DOE simply
stopped processing administrative applications for loan discharges, leaving some 45,000 discharged applications that had
been filed but not yet processed in limbo.49 Despite indicating that
it intended to revise the Borrower Defense rule in January 2017,50
the department took no action on the rule until mid-June, two
weeks before it was scheduled to take effect. On June 14, 2017, the
Department announced without prior notice that it was delaying
the rule indefinitely, ostensibly in response to “legal uncertainty”
created by a legal challenge to the Borrower Defense rule.
Indefinitely staying a final agency rule without notice and
an opportunity for comment violates the APA,51 and on July 6,
2017, a coalition of nineteen states filed suit against the DOE seeking a declaration that the stay is invalid.52 The DOE secured an
extension to answer the states’ complaint until October 18, 2017.53
On October 24, the Department issued an interim final rule that
formally stayed the original Borrower Defense rule until July 1,
2018.54 Until then, the Department would neither enforce the Borrower Defense rule’s standards nor process administrative discharge petitions.

49

See Andrew Kreighbaum, Long Wait for Loan Forgiveness, INSIDE
HIGHER EDUCATION (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/14/students-waiting-borrower-defense-claimsface-challenges-credit-obstacles-education.
50
See Final Regulations; Delay of Effective Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 8669
(Jan. 30, 2017) (to be codified at 2 C.F.R. pt. 347434; 99; 200; 299). (Identifying borrower defense rule as one of several rules that the Department
intended to revisit).
51
See Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
52
Complaint, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No. 1:17-CV-01331 (D.D.C.
July 6, 2017).
53
Minute Order, Massachusetts v. DeVos, No. 1:17-CV-01331 (D.D.C.
Aug. 30, 2017).
54
Student Assistance General Provisions, 82 FR 49114 (Oct. 24, 2017)
(interim final rule).
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Like the Fiduciary Rule, the Borrower Defense rule was
promulgated outside of the window during which it could be repealed via the CRA. Modifying the rule therefore required the
DOE to engage in a new rulemaking, which will be subject to a
State Farm challenge. The rule also gave rise to serious reliance
interests on the part of students who sought to invoke it to obtain
discharges from loans that schools persuaded students to secure
loans through fraudulent marketing. Students and their allies have
an accessible avenue to challenge the rule’s stay and repeal, because any actions the Department takes with respect to the rule are
subject to judicial review under the APA.
This is not to say that the DOL and DOE will necessarily
fail in their efforts to roll back the Fiduciary and Borrower Defense
Rules and their arbitration provisions. Whether the agencies succeed or fail will only be clear after they finalize changes to the original rules and the courts resolve challenges to those changes. Thus
far, however, the agencies have struggled to identify persuasive rationales for changing the regulatory status quo, made procedural
mistakes that created a significant risk of adverse judicial review,
and provoked influential constituencies that have a strong interest
in preserving the rules in their original form. If DOL and DOE
succeed in repealing the Fiduciary and Borrower Defense Rules,
the process will be slow, messy, and the subject of protracted legal
disputes.
III. CONTINUED REGULATION: THE NLRB’S MURPHY OIL RULE
If the arbitration regulations discussed thus far are to varying degrees consistent with the U-Turn hypothesis, the actions of
the NLRB are flatly inconsistent with it. That agency’s continued
efforts to regulate mandatory arbitration notwithstanding the
change in administrations has led the Justice Department to attack
its authority to regulate, giving rise to an extraordinary conflict
that pits one executive agency against another.
The NLRB’s regulation of arbitration took the form of
holdings in unfair labor practice proceedings that an employment
agreement which waives the employee’s right to engage in any
form of collective dispute resolution violates the right to engage in
“other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
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(NLRA).55 The Board first announced this conclusion in 2012 in In
re D.R. Horton.56 The Fifth Circuit rejected the Board’s view as
incompatible with the FAA,57 but the Board in In re Murphy Oil
declined to “acquiesce” in the court of appeals’ view.58 The Seventh
and Ninth Circuits endorsed the Board’s reading of the NLRA in
later cases where the Board followed Horton, creating a circuit
split over the lawfulness of an employment agreement that waives
the employee’s right to engage in any form of collective dispute
resolution.59
In January 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Murphy Oil and two other cases to resolve the conflict.60 In the
meantime, the NLRB continued to bring enforcement actions
against employers who use employment agreements that waive
employees’ right to participate in any form of collective litigation.61
The Trump administration’s inability to influence the
NLRB’s stance toward arbitration results most obviously from the
agency’s insulation from presidential control. The Board’s members may only be removed “for cause.”62 At all relevant times, the
NLRB was headed by Democratic appointees who do not share
the President’s regulatory philosophy. Their insulation from direct
presidential control enabled the Board to continue regulatory efforts that the White House opposes.63
55

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277, 2285 (2012).
57
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
58
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014).
59
Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis
v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). See also NLRB v. Alternative Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) (following the Board’s
view after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Morris and Lewis).
60
N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 909 (2017).
61
See Memorandum from Beth Tursell, Assoc. to the Gen. Counsel,
NLRB, re: Impact on pending cases due to Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA (Jan. 26, 2017).
62
See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
63
Republican appointees only gained a voting majority on the Board
on September 26, 2017, six days before the Supreme Court heard argument
in Murphy Oil and Epic Systems. The new majority understandably did
not attempt to reverse the Board’s position after the cases had been fully
briefed, and before the majority had an opportunity to reconsider the
Board’s position in the ordinary course. See Eric Morath,
56
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The administration’s inability to influence the NLRB’s
stance on arbitration also reflects some of the factors that affected
its efforts to roll back other Obama-era arbitration rules. The
NLRB’s decisions in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil are not subject
to congressional review under the CRA. The Board used a form of
administrative policymaking—adjudication—that will require it
to offered a reasoned explanation for changes in the agency’s position. This procedural choice lends the force of inertia to agency positions advanced against the White House’s wishes.
Although the relative formality of the NLRB’s arbitration
regulation protects it from being reversed at the administrative
level, questions about the Board’s authority provide the administration with a second opportunity to challenge its position. The
Solicitor General’s office petitioned for certiorari on behalf of the
NLRB in Murphy Oil. Following the change in administrations,
the office reconsidered its position and determined that its earlier
advocacy for the NLRB was mistaken, because its petition for certiorari did not “g[i]ve adequate weight to the congressional policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements that is reflected in
the FAA.”64 The office accordingly ceased representing the NLRB
and filed an amicus curiae brief opposing its former client.65 When
the Supreme Court heard argument in Murphy Oil on October 2,
2017, two agencies of the U.S. government faced off against one
another. The SG sided with employers seeking to bar employees
from collective litigation; the NLRB, with employees in defending
its own rule.
The emergence of intra-executive branch disputes about
the lawfulness of agency arbitration regulation is a new development in U.S. arbitration law. For decades, the prototypical arbitration dispute has pitted a firm seeking to enforce an arbitration
agreement against a counter-party, employee, or consumer seeking

Senate Confirms William Emanuel for National Labor Relations
Board, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 25, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-confirms-william-emanuel-for-national-labor-relations-board-1506379617.
64
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Epic Systems
v. Lewis, Nos. 16-285, 16-300, and 16-307 (U.S. 2017).
65
See id.
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access to the courts. The government would take a single position,
sometimes siding with the party seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement according to its terms, sometimes siding with the
party seeking access to the courts.
The executive branch’s stance toward the NLRB is different. In this case, different components of the government with different missions, statutory authority, and jurisdiction took divergent positions on the Board’s authority to regulate the use of
arbitration and the necessity of doing so. Their conflicts suggest
the elusiveness of a single “government” position on the policy and
legal response to arbitration. When it comes to arbitration, the government is a “they,” not an “it.”
CONCLUSION
The examples this Article discusses are not the only cases
where the Trump administration has attempted to roll back
Obama-era agency arbitration regulations.66 And a definitive analysis of the Trump administration’s effort to roll back Obama-era

66

On June 8, 2017, the Centers for Medicaid/Medicare Services (CMS)
announced that it intended to modify a provision of their 2016 Long-Term
Care Rule that barred nursing homes from using mandatory arbitration
clauses in their admission contracts. Where the 2016 rule completely
barred nursing homes from using arbitration in admission contracts, the
new provision required arbitration provisions to be written in plain language and explained to new residents. See Revision of Requirements for
Long-Term Care Facilities: Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 26649
(proposed June 8, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483). The proposed
revision mooted a challenge to the original Long-Term Care rule’s arbitration rule by the American Health Care Association, which led a district
court to preliminarily enjoin the Long-Term Care rule’s arbitration bar.
Am. Health Care Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (N.D. Miss.
2016). But it is too soon to say whether the revision—if it takes effect—
will succeed in deregulating nursing homes’ use of arbitration. The new
provision is based on the same statutory authority and same administrative record as the original Long-Term Care rule. A challenge to the revised
rule could result in a court upholding the rule, ordering CMS to reinstate
the original rule, or holding that CMS lacks any authority to regulate nursing homes’ use of arbitration.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provides another
example. Under President Obama, the Commission took the position in
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regulations will not be possible until the agency actions described
here are finalized and subject to judicial review.
Nonetheless, the cases this Article describes suffice to show
that—contrary to predictions immediately following the November 2016 election—Trump’s election and the Republicans’ defense
of their congressional majorities did not spell the end of federal
agencies’ efforts to regulate arbitration. The new administration
successfully rescinded some Obama-era regulations, but others
may prove difficult to roll back. Insulated from presidential control, the NLRB has pressed ahead with pre-existing efforts to regulate arbitration.
The persistence of agency arbitration regulation and the
conflicts that it has given rise to under Trump reflect deeper divisions about the federal administrative state. Political actors have
long recognized that the procedures and institutions through
which the law is enforced are as important to the real-world meaning of the law as the content of substantive regulatory mandates.67
A strong substantive mandate may be weakened or completely undermined by weak enforcement mechanisms. Conversely, strong
enforcement mechanisms can amplify the force of a law and give
rise to coalitions that support and strengthen a regulatory regime
over time. Recognizing this, debate over federal regulatory policy
proceeds at two levels, substance and procedure, that often are difficult to disentangle.

enforcement actions and amicus filings that mandatory arbitration clauses
violated Title VII when they were part of a pattern and practice of employment discrimination. See EEOC v. Doherty Ents., 126 F. Supp. 3d
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2015). It is not clear whether the Commission will continue
to take this position under Trump.
67
As memorably expressed by Representative John Dingell: “I’ll let
you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw
you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John
Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce). See generally
Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds.,
1989); Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the
Story, 6 J. LAW. ECON. & ORG. 213 (1990).
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The basic premise of arbitration is to privatize control over
an important set of decisions about the institutions and procedures
through which the law is enforced. As such, we should not be surprised that political actors with strikingly different views about the
role and function of the federal government take divergent positions on the merits of arbitration, the need to regulate it, and agencies’ legal authority to do so. What would be surprising is if the
election of a reactionary President who holds extreme views on federal regulatory policy somehow brought an end to those conflicts.
Far from eliminating controversy over federal agencies’ regulation
of arbitration, the 2016 election guaranteed that controversy would
continue.

